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There is increasing evidence to show that teachers’ epistemic cognition is related to how they 
conceive of and engage in teaching; therefore it is important that teachers develop adaptive epistemic 
cognition. This article provides an overview of the different ways of theorizing and investigating 
changes in epistemic cognition for  teaching and learning. A growing body of research shows that 
explicit reflection on epistemic cognition may be a useful way to promote change.  Drawing on the 
work of Lunn Brownlee and Schraw (in press) and the Advanced Study Colloquium (Cyprus ASC, 
2015) group described in the introduction to this Special Issue, we extend the concept of explicit 
reflection to encompass reflexive thinking. Reflexivity involves critical thinking that evaluates 
multiple perspectives in context and leads to specific action in the classroom.  The 3R-EC 
Framework (Reflection, Reflexivity and Resolved Action for Epistemic Cognition)  for theorising 
change in epistemic cognition is described and exemplified in the contexts of classroom practice and 









Changing teachers’epistemic cognition:  
a new conceptual framework for epistemic reflexivity 
 “The role of epistemological beliefs is likely to be subtle, yet ubiquitous. These beliefs are likely to 
influence how students learn, how teachers instruct, and subsequently, how teachers knowingly or 
unknowingly modify students’ epistemological beliefs” (Schommer-Aikins, 2004, p.27). 
In the dozen years since Schommer-Aikins made this (cautious) statement, research has flourished, 
nomenclature varied and implications have been drawn about the role of epistemic cognition in 
students’ learning and teachers’ instruction. There is growing evidence of relations between 
epistemic cognition and disciplinary learning, comprehension, critical thinking and teaching 
approaches (e.g., see Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, 2016; Kuhn, 2016; Lunn Brownlee, Johansson, 
Walker & Scholes, 2017). Given that these are crucial aspects of learning, teaching and education, 
the pertinence of epistemic matters in educational systems has become a focus of research attention. 
Notably, there is growing evidence to suggest that teachers’ epistemic cognition mediates how they 
conceive of and engage in teaching. Likewise, student teachers’ epistemic cognition may influence 
their understanding of teacher education courses and their depth and use of teaching knowledge 
(Buehl & Fives, 2016; Ferguson  & Lunn Brownlee, unpublished manuscript; Yadav & Koehler, 
2007).  
In light of the importance of epistemic cognition in teaching and learning, as well as research 
focusing on developing individuals’ conceptions and use of knowledge and research (Bendixen, 
2002; Kienhues, Ferguson, & Stahl, 2016), this article  introduces and explores the role of reflection 
and reflexivity for changing practicing and student teachers’ epistemic cognition. Specifically, we 
are interested in how to improve (student) teachers’ views of and interactions with knowledge, 
enabling them to engage with complex problem-solving and reliable processes of knowledge 
production. In the first section, we present a review of educational psychology research on epistemic 
cognition with a focus on teaching and teacher education, followed by a review of research on 




changing teachers’ epistemic cognition. Finally, we propose a framework for changing teachers’ 
epistemic cognition that draws on theories of teacher reflection and reflexivity. 
Research on epistemic cognition  
While the historical development of the construct of epistemic cognition are described in detail 
elsewhere (Greene, Azevedo,  & Torney-Purta , 2008; Hofer, 2016; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), we use 
epistemic cognition as an umbrella term for epistemic beliefs, epistemic development, 
epistemological beliefs and personal epistemologies (Greene et al., 2008). Since its inception in the 
1970s, research on epistemic cognition has experienced substantial growth  (Greene et al., 2016; 
Hofer, 2016). Earlier described as layperson’s folk epistemologies, unexamined understandings or 
common sense theories and “untutored views about the nature of knowledge” (Kitchener, R.F., 2002, 
p. 89), the use of the term epistemic cognition now reflects “how people acquire, understand, justify, 
change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts” (Greene et al., 2016, p. 1). To 
concretise further, we draw on two working definitions of epistemic cognition in this article. First, 
Greene and Yu (2016) describe “a process involving dispositions, beliefs, and skills regarding how 
individuals determine what they actually know, versus what they believe, doubt or distrust” (p. 2). 
Second, Chinn and colleagues’ definition is directed at cognitions about a network of interrelated 
epistemic topics including knowledge, its sources and justification, belief, evidence, truth, 
understanding and explanation (Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011). Both of these 
conceptualisations focus on a broad range of aspects of epistemic cognition, rather than on 
underlying beliefs that formed the basis of earlier research in this domain (see Hofer, 2016; Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997).  Drawing on a recent review by Hofer (2016), we now provide a brief overview of 
the movements that have shaped the study of  epistemic cognition in educational psychology 








The first era of research pertains to developmental models of epistemic cognition, initiated by 
Perry (1970) and followed up by Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule (1986) and Baxter 
Magolda (1992) (see Hofer, 2016). Within this tradition, Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) proposed 
qualitatively different levels of epistemological understanding. Young children initially view 
knowledge as a direct copy of reality before experiencing ensuing stages of absolutism, which 
represents a categorical, right-or-wrong view of knowledge representations.  Multiplism involves  the 
notion that all ideas are equal, since knowledge claims represent people’s equally valid opinions. 
Finally, evaluativism occurs when the veracity of claims are judged according to standards such as 
available evidence and argumentation. Typical for this way of viewing individuals’ epistemic 
cognition is that each stage of thinking is characterized by a different degree of ‘certain knowledge’, 
which in turn relates to the standards of  justification processes and critical thinking that will be 
deemed necessary or “correct” at that stage of epistemic cognition (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002).  
The beginning of a new era of epistemic cognition research occurred when Schommer (1990) 
investigated more or less independently developing epistemic dimensions (Hofer, 2016). Schommer 
labelled these continuous dimensions structure, stability, source of knowledge, ability and speed of 
learning. However, factor analyses based on Schommer’s work typically yield four factors relating to 
beliefs about: 
1.  fixed ability, ranging from the idea that intelligence is given and fixed, to views of intelligence 
as something that can be improved;  
2. the speed of learning, reflecting views that learning may occur quickly or not at all, to the idea 
that learning occurs at a gradual pace;  
3. simple knowledge, varying from regarding knowledge as consisting of isolated facts, to 
interrelated webs of knowledge; and  
4. certain knowledge, with views of knowledge ranging fom absolute and fixed, to tentative and 
evolving.  




In response to Schommer’s work and contemporary research programmes, Hofer and Pintrich 
(1997) referred to laypersons’ epistemological theories concerning the nature of knowledge (how one 
defines knowledge) and the nature of knowing (how one comes to know). Further, they proposed that 
each of these systems of beliefs could be further divided in two dimensions that build on and 
develope the foregone research. The two dimensions concerning the nature of knowledge are:  
1. certainty of knowledge, ranging from viewing knowledge as absolute, fixed and unchanging, to 
viewing knowledge as tentative and evolving; and  
2. simplicity of knowledge, ranging from viewing knowledge as consisting of an accumulation of 
facts, to viewing knowledge as a web of interrelated concepts.  
The two dimensions concerning the nature of knowing are:  
1. source of knowledge, ranging from conceiving knowledge as originating outside the self and 
residing in external authority from which it should be transmitted, to conceiving knowledge 
as actively constructed by the individual in interaction with others; and  
2. justification for knowing, which ranges from justification of knowledge claims via 
observation and confirmation by authority, or on the basis of what feels right, to the use of 
rules of inquiry and the evaluation and integration of different sources of evidence.  
Hofer and Pintrich proposed that each of the separate but likely related dimensions of beliefs 
could be considered to reflect a continuum from naïve to more advanced beliefs, thus reflecting the 
development of beliefs as portrayed by models such as Kuhn and Weinstock’s (2002). However, this 
classification has been criticised for  dichotomizing beliefs as better or worse, as well as for the 
negative connotations that are associated with the term naïve. Thus, Muis (2004) proposed the terms 
availing and nonavailing to replace advanced and naïve, where availing beliefs are those associated 
with better learning outcomes and nonavailing beliefs have no influence or are negatively associated 
with learning outcomes. This avoids the connotations associated with advanced and naïve beliefs.  
Further, in light of mixed findings concerning relations between so-called naïve or advanced 
epistemic cognition and educational outcomes (for discussions see for example, Bromme, Kienhues 




& Stahl, 2008; Ferguson & Bråten, 2013), Bromme and colleagues suggested that such relations 
might be context sensitive. They argued that sophisticated (i.e., advanced or availing) epistemic 
cognition might be reflected in a type of flexibility in one’s epistemic thinking, that is, an ability or 
tendency to apply different epistemic standards or practices in different contexts  (Bromme, et al., 
2008; Kienhues & Bromme, 2011). This  notion is linked to the third movement in epistemic 
cognition research, described next.  
The third movement is characterised by expansion of the epistemic cognition construct on 
several fronts (Hofer, 2016). Stemming from discussions about such matters as context sensitivity, 
specificity, dimensionality and methodologies used, developments have been made that are of special 
interest for the new framework described in this article. First, disciplinary studies have offered 
insight into the situated nature of epistemic cognition (Elby & Hammer, 2010). Specifically, they 
give credence to the idea that epistemic cognition may be even more fine-grained than what occurs at 
a domain level, for example, that it occurs at a topic-specific level as well (Bråten, Strømsø, & 
Samuelstuen, 2008). Second, intervention studies have provided preliminary evidence that epistemic 
cognition can be changed, at least in the short-term, by having students grapple with diverging views 
(Kienhues et al., 2016).  
Third, researchers have argued that one way of enriching educational research on epistemic 
cognition is to take a closer look at philosophical literature (Hofer, 2016), which has several 
implications for expansion of the construct (Chinn et al., 2011). Building on an extensive review of 
educational and philosophical literature (Chinn et al., 2011), Chinn and colleagues developed the 
AIR framework with a specific focus on epistemic Aims, Ideals and Reliable processes (Chinn et al., 
2014; Chinn & Rinehart, 2016). The first component, epistemic aims and values, draws attention to 
the idea that people can have different epistemic aims other than ascertaining knowledge, such as 
developing true beliefs, understanding or wisdom. As such, epistemic cognition widens the scope of 
the use of the term epistemic (Chinn & Rinehart, 2016). According to Chinn and Rinehart (2016), 
knowledge, understanding and explanation are all encompassed in the study of epistemology, with 




explanation and understanding falling under the headings of “other epistemic aims and products” (p. 
463). These form subsets of epistemic aims and values in the AIR model.  As Chinn and Rinehart 
note, people also attach different values to different kinds of knowledge and other epistemic aims. 
For example, knowledge about cognitive development may be viewed as more valuable than 
knowledge about individual differences by some teachers.  
Next, epistemic ideals are the “criteria or standards that must be met for [people] to judge 
that their epistemic aims have been achieved” (Chinn, et al., 2014, p. 433). For example, ideals can 
include standards that must be met if one is to rely on the testimony of others, sufficient complexity 
in an argument or piece of evidence or well-articulated explanations. Finally, the model includes 
reliable processes for achieving epistemic aims, such as argumentation or (in)formal logical 
reasoning (Chinn & Rinehart, 2016). Regarding the reliability of processes of knowledge production, 
Chinn and his colleagues focus on strategies, procedures and activities for achieving knowledge, 
understanding and other epistemic aims (Chinn et al., 2011).  Each of these dimensions is 
exemplified later in this article when Chinn’s model is re-explored as a part of the 3R-EC  
Framework.  
Epistemic cognition in teaching and teacher education.  
Recently, the idea that teachers’ epistemic cognition might provide insight into their development as 
teachers and into their teaching practices has been identified (e.g., Lunn Brownlee, Schraw & 
Berthelsen , 2011; Lunn Brownlee, Schraw, Walker & Ryan, 2016). We frame our review here by 
referring to research related to personal epistemology and epistemic cognition, which emerges 
typically from the field of educational psychology. Epistemic cognition influences the extent to 
which individuals make meaning of and engage with complex problem solving (Hofer, 2002). 
Therefore, it should be of critical importance for teachers given that the core business of teaching is 
managing complex learning environments with multiple stakeholders. Practicing teachers’ epistemic 
cognition has been shown to influence their teaching approach, the strategies they employ in the 
classroom and their expectations for students (Buehl & Fives, 2009; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2011). 




Student teachers’ epistemic cognition is thought to impact the depth of understanding achieved  
during teacher education courses and teachers’ decision-making, planning, orchestrating and 
assessment in subsequent practice  (Buehl & Fives, 2016; Yadav & Koehler, 2007). Moreover, 
teachers continue to learn throughout their teacher education programs. They are required to engage 
in continuous professional learning to develop their practice  and they orchestrate the learning of 
others (Buehl & Fives, 2016). In this section, therefore, we review epistemic cognition literature that 
relates specifically to teaching and teacher education: that is, teachers as practitioners and teachers as 
learners. We argue that availing epistemic cognition should be a goal of teaching and teacher 
education. We view teaching knowledge as a domain-specific example of epistemic cognition, since 
knowledge about teaching is a recognized and institutionalized body of knowledge (Fives & Buehl, 
2008).  
Epistemic cognition and teaching practice. 
Concerning teachers as practitioners, Feucht and Muis have both conducted a number of studies 
investigating aspects of knowledge representation and use in the classroom, termed the “epistemic 
climate” (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Feucht, 2010; Muis & Duffy, 2013). According to Feucht, the 
epistemic climate in a learning environment can foster or limit student learning, with the epistemic 
climate being shaped and influenced by teachers’ epistemic cognition and pedagogical practices. 
Epistemic climate refers to facets of knowledge and knowing that are salient in the classroom 
context. For example, the Educational Model of Personal Epistemology highlights the personal 
epistemologies of students and their teachers, the epistemic underpinnings of classroom practices and 
instructional artefacts as the defining factors of epistemic climate in the classroom context (Feucht, 
2010). Based on this framework, Feucht has explored the epistemic underpinnings of different 
classrooms, including teachers’ instruction and knowledge representation and their implications for 
students’ epistemologies (Feucht, 2010). Feucht concluded that teachers’ epistemic cognition can be 
classified according to different developmental levels but that it is also subject to change. He further 
proposed that teachers with availing epistemic cognition are “receptive to epistemic development” 




and “less resistant to educational reform”(2010,  p. 69), which in turn, influences teaching practices, 
students’ epistemic cognition, and the epistemic climate of the classroom. In a follow up 
investigation, Feucht (2011) showed specific links between teachers’ epistemic cognition and 
practice, such as absolutist views of knowledge as true and stable resulting in “step-by-step recipe” 
instruction and asking questions to determine “correct understanding” (p. 236).  
While our review has so far documented research showing relations between epistemic 
cognition and teaching practice, there is also evidence of inconsistency between teachers’ self-
reports of epistemic cognition and their practice (Lunn Brownlee et al., 2011). Thus, it is important 
to bear in mind that other factors influence teaching practice and learning, for example, social 
influences such as teacher professional standards and standardised testing regimes. Analyses of 
teacher professional standards from around the world (Bourke, Ryan, & Lloyd,  2016; Cochran-
Smith, 2005; Evans, 2011; Ryan  & Bourke,  2013) show that such standards promulgate an anti-
intellectual discourse that is based on achieving behavioural competences. Within this prevailing 
discourse, and evident in case study research with teacher educators in Australia (Bourke et al., 
2016), teachers are positioned as technicists who should demonstrate minimum standards of 
behaviour,, rather than intellectual and emotional professionals who evaluate  appropriate action 
according to contextual conditions, personal concerns and epistemic aims.  Research also has shown 
that standardized testing leads to reductionist practices (Comber, 2012; Ryan & Barton, 2014), 
whereby teaching goals relate to test preparation rather than to epistemic aims. 
Epistemic cognition and teacher education. 
Moving to a specific focus on teacher education, Lunn Brownlee et al. (2011) reviewed research 
showing that while student teachers’ personal epistemologies are considered to be important for their 
understanding of students’ approaches to learning and learning outcomes, this is still an emerging 
field of research. Yadav, Herron and Samarapungavan (2011) considered the ways in which student 
teachers’ epistemic cognition was important for teacher preparation. The authors surmised that 
student teachers’ epistemic cognition played a role in their perceptions and attention when observing 




other teachers, and in the teaching goals that they developed. Specifically, regarding student 
teachers’ epistemic cognition and teaching goals, Kang (2008) reported that preservice science 
teachers who viewed science knowledge as consisting of facts, set the goal of having students utilize 
science knowledge, whereas those who viewed science knowledge as evolving in nature, were more 
likely to aim to have students develop thinking skills necessary to conduct scientific inquiry.  
Yadav et al. (2011) further noted that student teachers’ epistemic cognition was related to 
their approaches to learning. With reference to a study by Chan (2003), Yadav et al. (2011) reported 
that beliefs about the source of knowledge predict different learning approaches in student teachers. 
While beliefs about knowledge stemming from external authorities were positively related  to surface 
learning approaches and negatively related to deeper learning approaches, the belief that learning 
entails effort and understanding was positively related to “deep and achieving approaches” to 
learning (p. 31). Similarly, in a study of epistemic cognition  focusing  on different knowledge 
sources and relations to motivation to learn from different aspects of a teacher preparation course, 
Bråten and Ferguson (2015) found that student teachers who trusted teacher educators and textbooks 
as sources of teaching knowledge were motivated to learn from formal teacher training courses. 
Students who placed more trust in other teachers and students as sources of teaching knowledge were 
more motivated to learn from the practical part of the teacher education course.  
On the basis of this review, we suggest that epistemic cognition should be an important focus 
for research on teaching practice and teacher education alike, because of its potential influence on 
instructional practices and approaches to (student and teacher) learning. However, research exploring 
ways of addressing  teachers’ epistemic cognition is somewhat underdeveloped and suggestions are 
often made in ways that do not provide specific guidance. We attempt to shed light on this complex 
endeavor in the next sections.  
Changing teachers’ epistemic cognition  
Given the connections between teachers’ epistemic cognition, the strategies they employ in the 
classroom (Buehl & Fives, 2009; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2011) and their expectations for students 




(Buehl & Fives, 2009), we argue that it is important to find ways to develop epistemic cognition in 
the context of teaching and teacher education programs. Lunn Brownlee et al’s review (2016) 
identified two main ways in which changes to epistemic beliefs might take place: as a result of 
engagement in higher order thinking (as described by conceptual change theory) and explicit 
reflection on epistemic beliefs (see also Parkinson & Maggioni, in press).  
Higher order thinking and conceptual change theory  
Conceptual change theory involves the process of resolving cognitive conflict (Bendixen, 2002; 
Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016). To illustrate, Bendixen’s (2002) interview study identified doubt or 
conflict as a key lever for belief change. The process of conceptual change requires first that students 
experience doubt about their beliefs, followed by engaging in new experiences that  enable them to 
understand, enact and experience success with their newfound ideas. This process essentially 
involves higher order thinking.  
The trigger for doubt or cognitive conflict in teacher education programs might involve 
exposure to conflicting theoretical perspectives (Parkinson & Maggioni, in press).  In support of this 
notion, a number of long-term (longitudinal) and short-term interventions  demonstrate that cognitive 
conflict may promote epistemic belief change for student teachers (for a review see Lunn Brownlee 
et al., 2016). Longitudinal studies have explored changes in student teachers as they progress through 
their teacher education programs. These studies suggest cognitive conflict induced by constructivist 
approaches to learning (Rodríguez & Cano, 2007), or exposure to conflicting theories (Sosu & Gray, 
2012; Walker, Brownlee, Whiteford, Exley & Woods, 2012), may promote belief change (Lunn 
Brownlee et al., 2016).  Such belief change has also been shown to take place in relatively short-term 
interventions (Gill, Ashton & Algina, 2004; Kienhues, Bromme, & Stahl, 2008; Lunn Brownlee et 
al., 2016). These interventions involve the use of what is known as refutational texts, which serve as 
a mechanism to induce cognitive conflict by making the reader question previously held conceptions 
and become dissatisfied with them. Further, this intervention strategy always includes factual 




information in the texts, “because conceptual change encompasses not only a reorganization of pre-
existing knowledge but also an integration of new knowledge.” (Kienhues et al., 2008, p. 549).   
Explicit reflection on epistemic beliefs 
While a growing body of research suggests that teachers’ epistemic beliefs might be challenged and 
changed by way of cognitive conflict and higher order thinking, there is also evidence to suggest a 
role for explicit reflection in changing epistemic beliefs (see Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016 for a 
review). Specifically, metacognitive reflection on one’s epistemic beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and the process of knowing can support changes in epistemic cognition (Lunn Brownlee, 
et al., 2011; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016; Muis, 2007).  Deniz (2011) and Güven, Sülün and Çam 
(2014) asked student teachers to engage in reflection on their epistemic beliefs as they participated in 
science units. Both studies reported  changes in student teachers’ epistemic beliefs:  Denez noted 
changes in certainty and simplicity, justification, source and attainability of truth; and Güven et al. 
noted changes in quick learning, innate ability, source of knowledge and simple knowledge.  Other 
studies by Charalambous, Panaoura, and Phillippou (2009), Valanides and Angeli (2005), and Tsai 
(2006) also point to a metacognitive process of explicit reflection in promoting change in teachers’ 
epistemic beliefs.   
However, while this research is instructive in helping us to consider how best to promote 
changes in epistemic beliefs, there is growing evidence that such explicit reflections need to take 
place in the context of teaching practices in the classroom. Adibelli and Bailey (in press) suggested 
that in addition to having preservice teachers reflect on their epistemic beliefs, they also need to 
engage in or observe teaching practices which actually mirror those epistemic beliefs.  Similarly,  
Fives and Buehl (in press) argued that  having teachers to reflect on their epistemic beliefs, needs to 
take place in conjunction with teaching experiences that are supportive of such epistemic beliefs. 
These studies point to the idea that epistemic beliefs might evolve by embedding explicit reflection 
on such beliefs within the contexts of actual teaching practice that is constructivist in nature. In other 




owrds, teaching experiences need to be accompanied by explicit reflections on how epistemic 
cognition might be related to one’s actual teaching practice (Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016). This 
process can be described as enacted epistemic cognition and forms the basis for the 3R-EC 
(Epistemic Cognition) Framework.  This framework includes a focus on epistemic reflexivity as a 
process that promotes change in epistemic cognition. The framework and the specific notion of 
epistemic reflexivity is described in more detail in the following sections.   
Epistemic reflexivity  
Much of the extant literature which refers to the role of explicit reflection in promoting epistemic 
cognition has not been clear about how this should take place. One way in which the role of 
reflection in epistemic belief change might be developed is to clarify what we mean by reflection and 
how we might extend this notion to include reflection as enacted epistemic cognition. Drawing on 
the work of Lunn Brownlee al. (2016), we propose that the concept of explicit reflection can be 
extended to encompass what is known as epistemic reflexivity as described in the 3R-EC 
Fframework.  
What is reflexivity? 
Ryan  (2015) argues that reflexivity is often used interchangeably with other terms such as critical or 
transformative reflection (Ryan & Bourke, 2013). We view reflection as a necessary component of 
reflexivity, the latter characterised by internal dialogue and deliberative action following reflective 
thought. Although some forms of reflective learning rely on metacognitive thinking strategies (Dahl, 
2004), that is thinking about thinking, these alone fail to account for changes in learning behaviour. 
In contrast to reflection, reflexivity is characterised by an internal dialogue that takes place in order 
to understand and evaluate multiple perspectives (the indivdiual’s and those situated in the broader 
social context, e.g., those based on school policies, curriculum expectations, social justice agendas) , 
and maintain or change courses of action based on this dialogue (Archer, 2010). We argue that 




thinking about epistemic cognition in the context of teaching practice can be considered as reflexive 
in nature and is the main conceptual focus of the 3R-EC Framework.   
Building on work by Archer (2012), Ryan and Bourke (2013) argued that in order to promote 
changes in teaching practices  teachers need to engage in a process of reflexivity through which they 
consider their personal values and motivations in relation to the immediate context but also the 
broader political and social context. “The distinguishing feature of reflexivity is that it has the self-
referential characteristic of ‘bending-back’ some thought upon self, such that it takes the form of 
subject-object-subject” (Archer, 2012, p. 2). Here “subject” and “object” are not specific epistemic 
dimensions but refer to self, and the context and structures that influence, and are influenced by, the 
reflection that is happening respectively.  As such, reflexivity is characterized as an internal 
conversation that includes discernment (reflecting on a key issue or aim for them as a teacher or 
person, for example, student wellbeing); deliberation (reflexively weighing personal and contextual 
concerns including motivations, priorities and the impact of potential subversion of expected 
practices such as teaching to the test); and dedication (resolved action, for example, not following 
school leadership expectations of testing drills in order to maintain the goal of student wellbeing) 
(Archer, 2012). Ryan and Bourke (2013) explained that reflexivity is always situated and potentially 
transformative in nature and thus, is more likely to impact on teaching and learning directly.  
Epistemic reflexivity and the 3R-EC Framework  
In recent theorizing, Lunn Brownlee al. (2016) adapted Ryan and Bourke’s (2013)  work by focusing 
on reflexivity as a process that leads to change in teachers’ epistemic cognition. This framework, 
known as the 3R Framework of Reflexivity, was refined further through discussions with the Cyprus 
ASC group (see introduction in this special issue; Cyprus ASC, 2015). Based on these discussions, 
the framework became known as the 3R-EC Framework to reflect better the alignment with current 
theory in the field of epistemic cognition (Chinn et al., 2011; 2014). Epistemic cognition within this 
framework needs to be examined in specific teaching and learning contexts, rather than more broadly 
as epistemic beliefs. This context sensitivity is important for understanding how objective, contextual 




demands (such as the nature of the discipline, the school community expectations or government 
accountability agendas) impact teachers’ motivations, understandings and, most importantly, 
subsequent actions. 
The 3R-EC Framework for epistemic reflexivity focuses on making the epistemic aims and 
reliable processes explicit (Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016; Ryan , 2015). It draws specifically on Chinn 
et al.’s AIR model (2011; 2014) to relate such epistemic cognition to reflexivity in specific teaching 
and learning contexts.  The value of using the AIR model is that the identification of specific 
epistemic aims, ideals and reliable processes embeds the “epistemic” in everyday teaching 
interactions. The steps of the framework are represented visually in Figure 1 and described below. 
We argue that the reflection-reflexive distinctions have much to offer to the field of epistemic 
cognition change in teaching and teacher education (Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016).  
Step 1 - Reflections on classroom practice (discernment) 
When considering teachers as practitioners in classrooms, the first step in the framework involves 
teachers discerning classroom issues and then identifying specific teaching practices that might 
address such issues (see Figure 1). Here, teachers might reflect on a teaching/learning issue of 
individual or group concern. The 3R-EC Framework, however, argues that in addition to reflection 
on teaching practices, it is important to identify epistemic aims that might be associated with such 
practices.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
According to Chinn et al. (2011), epistemic aims are considered to be central to epistemic 
cognition. One important epistemic aim relates to knowledge, which involves developing justified 
true beliefs. These are “beliefs that accurately represent a particular aspect of the world (at least 
approximately) and that are supported by accurate reasons” (Chinn et al., 2011, p. 147).  Other 
epistemic aims include understanding and explanations. Chinn, Duncan, Dianovsky and Rinehart 
(2013) argued that unlike an aim of developing justified true beliefs (knowledge), individuals who 




aim to understand or provide explanations are more likely to learn differently by seeking reasons and 
explanations for why things happen the way they do. Teachers can focus on a range of epistemic 
aims for classroom teaching practices that include a focus on knowledge, understanding, or 
explanations.  These epistemic aims may also be related to epistemic values, which, Chinn et al. 
(2011; 2014) argue, are a significant feature of epistemic cognition. For example, the value that 
teachers place on developing knowledge in the classroom will influence epistemic aims for 
children’s learning and the use of reliable processes to develop knowledge and/or explanations about 
teaching practices (epistemic ends). 
Teachers may have both epistemic and non-epistemic aims for children in their classrooms. It 
is important for teachers to be able to distinguish between these aims as they engage in teaching 
practice (Chinn et al., 2014). For example, a non-epistemic aim of promoting social inclusion in the 
classroom, which takes account of multiple cultural diversities, might influence the epistemic aim to 
develop understanding and explanation of injustice. This would take place  by evaluating a range of 
perspectives about diversity and inclusion through examining relevant research, cultural values in the 
school, of  parents and those of their fellow teachers. It is important in the 3R-EC Framework that 
research explores how both epistemic and non-epistemic aims work together to achieve epistemic 
ends. 
The reflective process in Step 1 of the 3R-EC Framework is illustrated using teaching for 
active citizenship as an example.  This first step supports teachers to reflect on what teaching 
practices might help children to understand active citizenship in the classroom. As indicated by the 
linking “&” arrow in the Table, we argue that teachers also need to identify clearly the epistemic 
aims embedded in such practices.    
[Insert Table 1 here] 




Step 2 - Reflexive thinking - deliberation 
Once teachers have reflected on epistemic aims and teaching practices, the next step in the 
framework is to engage in reflexive deliberation or internal dialogue that involves a process of 
considering ‘what does this mean for me?’.  This is what Archer (2012) and Ryan  (2015) described 
as bending back thinking processes (see also Lunn Brownlee et al., 2016). Bending back in the 
context of the 3R-EC Framework means that teachers deliberate on the extent to which the self-
identified classroom practices from Step 1 might prove to be reliable processes for achieving such 
aims. 
Chinn et al. (2014) describe reliable processes as the third component of the AIR model of 
epistemic cognition. They are “schemas specifying the reliable processes by which epistemic 
products (such as knowledge, understanding, explanations or models) are produced” (p. 436). In the 
example of the epistemic aims of promoting understanding and explanation, a reliable process would 
be one which ensures that children are engaged in listening to others’ ideas in the classroom and then 
using such perspectives to come to an informed opinion.  We argue that in the context of the 3R-EC 
Framework, such reliable processes may include teaching practices which support children to engage 
in argumentation that accesses many points of view. Conversely, an unreliable process for achieving 
the epistemic aim of understanding and explanation might be to engage children through direct 
teaching instruction about a certain topic. Understanding reliable processes also means explicating 
the conditions in which processes may be considered to be reliable. This focus on conditions is not 
present in other EC frameworks. For example, argumentation may not be a reliable process if the 
discussion becomes aggressive and lacks clear argument or if people do not feel comfortable about 
contributing to the discussion.  
Extending the example of teaching for active citizenship, we now exemplify the reflexive 
thinking process that extends Step 1 into Step 2. Reflexivity is a more complex process than 
reflection alone because it involves internal negotiations and action cycles. In these cycles, the 
teacher is required to connect back to self through the process of calibrating their own teaching 




practices with reliable processes for achieving epistemic aims (see Table 2). Once again the “&” 
arrow in Table 2 highlights the needs to consider both the “epistemic” and teaching practices 
together.   
[Insert Table 2 here]  
 
In Step 2, reflexivity involves teachers evaluating a range of teaching practices in tandem 
with their identified epistemic aims for those approaches to teaching.  It is such epistemic reflexivity, 
grounded in teaching practices, which we argue can lead to changes in teachers’ epistemic cognition. 
Ryan (2015) makes a strong case for ensuring that reflexivity forms an explicit component of all 
teaching and learning, whereby action and re-action are built into the cycle of deliberation. The focus 
of the previously described Step 1 was on  teachers reflecting on  their epistemic aims. We argue that 
changes in epistemic cognition are more likely to take place through a process of reflexivity (Step 1 
and Step 2), which requires internal negotiations about how epistemic aims calibrate with actual 
teaching practices and lead to reliable processes for classroom practices. Maggioni and Parkinson 
(2008) also argued that teachers could be supported in the process of calibrating their epistemic 
beliefs with their teaching practices, by providing them with help to understand the variations 
between their beliefs and practices.  
Step 3 - Resolved action (dedication)  
Finally, in Step 3 Resolved action, teachers engage in decision-making and subsequent enactment of 
this decision-making in the classroom (also known as dedication) based on epistemic reflexivity 
described in Step 2.  Table 3 provides a description and exemplar of this final step.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Conclusion and implications 
Reflection has been noted as a key way to change epistemic cognition but we have argued in this 
article that this needs to be extended to take account of epistemic reflexivity. Epistemic reflexivity 




involves calibrating epistemic aims with reliable processes for teaching, and then enacting this in 
one’s practice. The 3R-EC Framework introduced in this article addresses explicit epistemic 
reflexivity in the contexts of classroom practice. We do not suggest that this framework would form 
the basis of every classroom interaction or lesson. Sometimes the aim in a particular lesson is to 
practice skills, to learn basic ‘rules’ of grammar or number, for example, or to consolidate previous 
understandings. The framework’s focus on action-oriented reflexivity for teachers to interrogate and 
potentially change their epistemic cognition for teaching practice is very useful for teaching 
contested forms of knowledge, or complex concepts that rely on interactions between subject and 
object for meaning to emerge.  An example of the latter would be consideration of government 
policy concerning asylum seekers, which deals with emotive (subjective)  issues within objective 
structures of human rights, border protection, child protection, the law and so on. As such, the 3R-
EC Framework provides a new way forward, perhaps a ‘fourth wave’ in epistemic cognition 
research. 
Thirteen years after Schommer-Aikins’ (2004) suggestion that epistemic cognition might play 
a subtle role in education, the idea seems to be more established through a sparse, but growing body 
of research. The complexity of issues to be solved and the multiplicity of knowledge production and 
representation in modern society mean that a focus on availing knowledge and beliefs is imperative 
for teachers. The influence of teachers’ epistemic cognition on their teaching practices has been 
documented in the literature (Buehl & Fives, 2016; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2011) and therefore 
deserves more attention in teacher education and professional learning. Though several researchers 
have put forward the idea that (student) teachers need to reflect on their beliefs and practices, few 
have provided a framework for how this might occur.   
 We posit that changes in epistemic cognition may take place through reflexivity, not just 
reflection about teaching practice.  Such reflexivity demands internal dialogues that evaluate a range 
of approaches to teaching, with explicit consideration of how they constitute reliable processes for 




achieving epistemic aims.  We believe that this epistemic reflexivity, grounded in both teaching 
practice and epistemic cognition, provides a mechanism for changing teachers’ epistemic cognition. 
This reflexive approach to teaching may also help to reposition “teachers as professionals, 
working with the cognitive dimensions of knowledge and the emotional dimensions of teaching, for 
the greater good of the teaching profession”, rather than as technicians addressing standards (Bourke, 
Ryan  & Lloyd, 2016, p. 3). Reflexive, intellectual, and emotional professionals who weigh 
appropriate action with contextual conditions, personal concerns and epistemic aims are more likely 
to move beyond a focus on test preparation in their classrooms, to engage with epistemic aims that 
relate to knowledge, understanding and explanation.  Our framework rests on a host of existing 
educational and philosophical literature on epistemic cognition, yet its strength can only be tested 
through further empirical work such as longitudinal classroom interventions and formal evaluations 
of teaching and learning. 
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Figure 1. The 3R–EC Framework of Epistemic Reflexivity (adapted from Lunn Brownlee et al., in 
press; Lunn Brownlee, et al., 2016; Cyprus ASC, 2015) 
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Table 1. Step 1 Reflection and exemplar 
Step 1 –Reflection 
on… 
Description and example 
Teaching practices  Teachers reflect on teaching practices that support children to achieve 
understanding about active citizenship for example, providing scenarios or 
provocations to which children respond. 
 
Epistemic aims 
Teachers might agree that a social justice agenda for active citizenship 
requires epistemic aims of understanding and explanation (reasoning) 
about injustice and exclusion to promote critical moral pedagogy – this 













Description and example 
Teaching 
practices  
Teachers are encouraged to reflexively evaluate (internal dialogue) alternative 
perspectives and ideas about teaching.  This leads teachers to evaluate a range of 
teaching practices based on research and practice. This range of viewpoints might 
include those expressed by parents, children, the research, and colleagues with 






Teachers engage in internal dialogue about how teaching practices engage children 
in the epistemic aims of understanding and explanation and how they might need 
to modify their practices to achieve these aims.  This is a type of calibration of 
epistemic aims with teaching practices.   
Chinn et al. (2013) described practices (i.e., reliable processes) for promoting 
understanding and explanation which might  include accountable talk, 
argumentation, scaffolds (supporting language like “ disagree with…”), epistemic 
categories (ways to distinguish between evidence and opinions, standards used to 
evaluate knowledge), establishing norms in classroom and holding children 
accountable (e.g., shared commitment to reasoned argumentation – children can 
get goals and evaluate performance against these).  
In the example of active citizenship, scenarios can allow for these processes in 
reasoning about what constitutes injustice or exclusion, what might be argued as 









Table 3. Step 3 Resolved action and exemplars 
Step 3 Resolved action 
regarding… 
Description and example  
Teaching practices  Using the example of teaching for active citizenship, resolved action 
involves teachers deciding on a course of action. This involves enacting 
teaching practices for active citizenship in the classroom that support 
children epistemically to understand and explain (reason) as they recognise 
and engage with social inequality and oppression in the classroom. Such 




Outcomes, which are perceived by teachers to be successful (i.e. epistemic 
aims achieved) may then lead to further changes in teachers’ epistemic 
aims (leading back to step 1 and discernment of other aims). For example, 
were the scenarios powerful enough to prompt different viewpoints about 
inclusion, exclusion and injustice? Did the opportunities to respond to the 
scenarios lead students to adopt the same beliefs as the teacher or did they 
prompt critical argumentation processes and the use of evidence to advance 
a point of view? Do the scenarios need to change? Do the processes of 
responding to the scenarios need to be re-calibrated to be more dialogic? 
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